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Abstract 
Dualistic interpretations attempt to solve the measurement problem of quantum mechanics by 
postulating the existence of non-physical minds, and by giving a suitable dynamical equation 
for how these minds evolve. I consider the relative merits of three extant dualistic 
interpretations (Albert and Loewer’s single-mind and many-minds interpretations, and Squires’ 
interpretation), and I defend Squires’ interpretation as preferable to the Albert/Loewer 
interpretations. I also argue that, for all three of these interpretations, the minds evolve 
independently of the physical universe, and hence render the physical universe otiose; the 
interpretations are better viewed as supporting not dualism, but mental monism. 
 
 
1. Introduction.  The quantum-mechanical measurement problem arises because the standard 
quantum dynamics (the Schrödinger equation) and the standard quantum semantics (the 
eigenstate-eigenvalue link) make predictions about systems that seem to be incompatible with 
our experience. The standard dynamics and standard semantics predict that one can easily set 
up a system whereby a cat is neither alive nor dead, for example, and yet we always experience 
cats as being either alive or dead.  
                                                
1I thank Frank Arntzenius, Jeff Barrett, and Bas van Fraassen for helpful discussion.  
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It is often said that, in order to solve the measurement problem, either one must modify 
the standard dynamics (as is done by GRW theory, for example), or one must modify the 
standard semantics (as is done by modal interpretations, for example). Dualistic 
interpretations, however, modify neither the standard dynamics nor the standard semantics.2 
Dualistic interpretations solve the measurement problem by postulating the existence of non-
physical minds, and by giving a dynamics for these minds which ensures that the probabilities 
for experiences of measurement outcomes are given by Born’s rule.  
This paper has two main theses. The first is that Euan Squires’ dualistic interpretation 
is preferable to David Albert and Barry Loewer’s single-mind and many-minds interpretations. 
The second is that, for all three of these interpretations, the minds evolve independently of the 
physical universe, and hence render the physical universe otiose; the interpretations are better 
viewed as supporting not dualism, but mental monism. 
 
2. The Single-Mind and Many-Minds Interpretations.  I will now explain the dualistic 
interpretations, focussing on Albert and Loewer’s (1988) single-mind and many-minds 
interpretations. Consider a system which starts out in the state 
(c1 |x-spin=‘up’〉e  +  c2 |x-spin=‘down’〉e) |pointer=‘ready’〉p |B=‘ready’〉Eve ,  (1) 
where e is an electron, P a measuring apparatus, and Eve an observer. The state |B=‘ready’〉Eve 
represents some particular state of the particles which compose Eve’s brain at a time when 
Eve is ready to look at the measuring apparatus to see what it registers. Suppose that by the 
standard dynamics the system evolves to the state 
                                                
2At least, dualistic interpretations need not make such modifications to solve the 
measurement problem. Proponents of a dualistic interpretation could promulgate a 
nonstandard semantics if they so desired.  
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c1 |x-spin=‘up’〉e |pointer=‘up’〉p |B=‘up’〉Eve  
+  c2 |x-spin=‘down’〉e |pointer=‘down’〉p |B=‘down’〉Eve.    (2) 
Here the state |B=‘up’〉Eve , for example, represents some particular state of the particles which 
compose Eve’s brain at a time shortly after she has looked at a P measuring apparatus with its 
pointer pointing to ‘up’.3 
Albert and Loewer’s single-mind interpretation grants that (2) is the correct state of 
the physical universe, but asserts that it is not a complete description of the universe. In 
addition to the physical universe, there exist non-physical minds which always have definite, 
non-superposed beliefs. A single mind exists for each conscious observer. To ensure that the 
predictions of standard quantum mechanics are duplicated, the dynamics for minds are such 
that the probabilities for what minds believe are given by Born’s rule.4 Thus, Eve starts out in 
a ready state, believing that she is ready to make a measurement, and the probability that she 
will end up believing that the x-spin is up is |c1|2, while the probability that she will end up 
believing that the x-spin is down is |c2|2. 
Albert and Loewer point out two problems for the single-mind interpretation. The first 
is that mental states do not supervene on brain states, since the quantum state of the system 
does not always determine what an observer believes; the same quantum state is compatible 
with different mental states. Because of this failure of supervenience, Albert and Loewer say 
                                                
3I am assuming that that state is orthogonal to the state where Eve has looked at a 
pointer pointing to down, and to the state where Eve is ready to look at the pointer; if that 
turns out not to be the case then my argument still goes through, just in a slightly more 
complicated fashion.  
4More precisely, the interpretation should specify not the probabilities for what beliefs 
minds have, but the probabilities for what phenomenal experiences minds have. A person who 
is convinced of the truth of the interpretation could have the phenomenal experience of the 
pointer pointing to ‘up’, but would not believe that the pointer actually points to ‘up’. Instead 
the person would believe that the pointer neither points to ‘up’ nor ‘down’ (since the pointer is 
involved in the superposition, and the standard semantics holds).  
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that “the non-physicalism of the [single-mind interpretation] seems especially pernicious” 
(1988, 206).  
The other problem, emphasized by Albert (1992, 130) is the mindless hulk problem. 
Suppose that some other observer, Adam, measures the x-spin of a different electron, also 
prepared in a superposition of x-spin eigenstates, and suppose Eve and Adam tell each other 
what results they got. This leads to a superposition state with four terms, corresponding to: 
|B=“I got ‘up’, Adam got ‘up’”〉Eve ⊗ |B*=“I got ‘up’, Eve got ‘up’”〉Adam ,     (3) 
|B=“I got ‘up’, Adam got ‘down’”〉Eve ⊗ |B*=“I got ‘down’, Eve got ‘up’”〉Adam , 
|B=“I got ‘down’, Adam got ‘up’”〉Eve ⊗ |B*=“I got ‘up’, Eve got ‘down’”〉Adam , and 
|B=“I got ‘down’, Adam got ‘down’”〉Eve ⊗ |B*=“I got ‘down’, Eve got ‘down’”〉Adam .
        
     
The single-mind interpretation only specifies probabilities for individual minds evolving, and 
thus places no constraints on correlations between minds. It follows that it could happen that 
Eve’s mind is associated with the first term of the superposition, say, while Adam’s mind is 
associated with the last term in the superposition. Thus, Eve would believe that Adam got 
‘up’, while Adam would believe that he got ‘down’. It follows when Eve hears Adam say that 
he got ‘up’, she is actually listening to not a conscious person but a mindless hulk.  
Albert and Loewer attempt to resolve these problems by rejecting the single-mind 
interpretation in favor of the many-minds interpretation. On the many-minds interpretation, 
each conscious observer is associated with a continuous infinity of minds, where each mind 
evolves in accordance with the rule for mind evolution of the single-mind interpretation. Albert 
and Loewer claim that this solves the supervenience problem of the single-mind interpretation, 
since measure |c1|2 of Eve’s minds will believe ‘up’, while measure |c2|2 of Eve’s minds will 
believe ‘down’, and these probabilities can be read off the quantum state. Also, Albert and 
Loewer claim that the the many-minds interpretation solves the mindless hulk problem of the 
single-mind interpretation, since every term in a superposition that corresponds to a conscious 
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being will have minds associated with it.  
 
3. Problems with with Albert/Loewer Interpretations.  I will show that, contra Albert and 
Loewer, the many-minds interpretation does not solve the supervenience problem of the 
single-mind interpretation, and it also does not completely solve the mindless hulk problem. 
The reason it does not solve the supervenience problem is that, even in the many-minds 
interpretation, mental states do not supervene on brain states. To see this, consider again the 
system which starts out in state (1) and evolves to state (2). On the many-minds interpretation, 
when the system is in state (1) each of Eve’s continuous infinity of minds is in the ready state, 
believing for example that she is ready to make a measurement. When the system evolves to 
state (2), each of Eve’s minds has a |c1|2 probability of evolving in such a way that the mind 
comes to believe ‘up’, and a |c2|2 probability of evolving in such a way that the mind comes to 
believe ‘down’. Thus, for each mind, it could happen that the mind comes to believe ‘down’, 
and as a result it could happen that every mind comes to believe ‘down’. There is a measure 
zero probability of this happening, but that does not mean that it cannot happen. 
(At this stage one might hold that, instead of the Albert/Loewer many-minds 
interpretation, it would be better to consider a many-minds interpretation where it is 
guaranteed that measure |c1|2 of Eve’s minds come to believe ‘up’ and measure |c2|2 ‘down’. 
The problem with such an interpretation (as explained by Loewer 1996) is that there is no way 
to make sense of that measure as a probability measure, and hence the fact that the 
probabilities for measurement outcomes are in accordance with Born’s rule gives evidence for 
the Albert/Loewer many-minds interpretation and not for this alternative many-minds 
interpretation.) 
It follows that the Albert/Loewer many-minds interpretation is no different than the 
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single-mind interpretation with regard to supervenience. On the Albert/Loewer many-minds 
interpretation, mental states do not supervene on brain states, since a given brain state is 
compatible with different configurations of mental states. Jeff Barrett (1995), citing Marc 
Albert, has made a version of this point, but Barrett does not draw the correct conclusion. 
Barrett writes that  
The mental state of each of the observer’s minds is a random function of his physical 
state and independent of the states of his other minds. This means that the observer’s 
global mental state ... almost always supervenes on his physical state.  (Barrett 1995, 
98) 
Barrett concludes that, because the supervenience relation almost always holds, “This lack of 
strict supervenience does not seem to be a very serious problem” (1995, 98). 
Barrett misunderstands the notion of supervenience, though. Supervenience is a modal 
notion, and does not admit of degree. If property B supervenes on property A, then all 
accessible possible worlds which have the same A-properties must also have the same B-
properties. In our situation, though, there can exist two worlds with the same physical state, 
but with different mental states. Consider two worlds in the physical state (2), but where in 
one world measure |c1|2 of Eve’s minds believe ‘up’, where in the other world all of Eve’s 
minds believe ‘down’. Thus, on the many-minds interpretation, mental states do not supervene 
on physical states. It doesn’t make any sense to say that they “almost always” supervene.  
It follows that the non-physicalism of the many-minds interpretation is just as 
pernicious as the non-physicalism of the single-mind interpretation, so supervenience 
considerations do not give one a reason to favor the many-minds interpretation over the 
single-mind interpretation. What about mindless hulk considerations? Here we can say that the 
the many-minds interpretation almost always solves the mindless hulk problem, since there is 
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only a measure zero probability that mindless hulks will exist on the many-minds 
interpretation.  
Nevertheless, the mindless hulk issue does not give strong support to the many-minds 
interpretation as compared to the single-mind interpretation, because one can formulate a 
version of the single-mind interpretation which does not face the mindless hulk problem. We 
can add an additional postulate to the Albert/Loewer single-mind interpretation, which 
specifies that the minds which exist in some system pick out a preferred branch of the 
superposition state of the system, and any new minds which come to exist in that system, or 
any minds which are part of a system which comes to interact with the original system, must 
also be associated with that preferred branch. For example, suppose that Eve’s mind believes 
‘up’ when the system is in state (3). When Adam interacts with Eve, since the superposition 
term with |believes ‘up’〉Eve is the preferred branch of the superposition, Adam’s mind will 
come to believe that Eve got ‘up’.  
This proposal captures the essence of the dualistic interpretation proposed by Euan 
Squires (1990). Squires gives a version of the single-mind interpretation, where each 
observer’s non-physical mind is associated with one branch of the universal superposition state 
(where the minds pick out a preferred basis). He considers an EPR-style experiment with 
perfect anti-correlation, and asks the question: supposing that I get the result ‘up’, how is it 
guaranteed that you get the result ‘down’? Squires does not consider the possibility that, when 
I later appear to tell you about my ‘up’ result, the thing telling you that is really just a mindless 
hulk. Instead, Squires postulates a “universal consciousness” (1990, 216) which ensures the 
desired correlations between minds. Squires considers various possibilities for what this 
consciousness might amount to, but the picture he seems to endorse is one where each 
person’s consciousness is a part of the universal consciousness. I believe that it is not 
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necessary to get bogged down in the metaphysics of a particular model of universal 
consciousness; it is enough just to specify that, somehow, the appropriate correlations 
between individual minds obtain.  
4. Dualism versus Mental Monism.  There are two reasons Albert and Loewer moved from 
the single-mind to the many-minds interpretation, and it turns out that neither reason is a good 
one. The many-minds interpretation does not, after all, allow for mental states to supervene on 
physical states, and one can give a version of the single-mind interpretation which does not 
face the mindless hulk problem. We should not be sanguine about the single-mind 
interpretation, however; I will now present a problem for all the dualistic interpretations. 
The problem is that the most natural ontology for these interpretations turns out to be 
not dualism, but mental monism. Any physical state of the universe does no work in the 
dualistic interpretations. Mental states do not supervene on, or emerge from, physical states. 
Interactionist dualism is false, because there is no interaction between the physical and the 
mental: the quantum state evolves in accordance with Schrödinger’s equation, while minds 
evolve in accordance with some incompletely specified mental dynamical equation. One can 
obtain evidence that the physical state of the universe is irrelevant to dualistic interpretations 
by noting that proponents of dualistic interpretations do not bother to specify a semantics for 
the quantum state; they do not say what the physical ontology of their interpretation is. 
Because of this I have taken them to endorse the standard semantics of quantum mechanics, 
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the eigenstate-eigenvalue link.5  
                                                
5One caveat: if belief observables exist, then the standard semantics would have to be 
modified at least slightly. Taking B as a belief observable, then when the system is in state (2), 
the standard semantics entail that Eve neither believes the pointer points to ‘up’ nor that it 
points to ‘down’. This contradicts the prediction of for example Squires’ interpretation, that 
Eve will have a definite belief. For a discussion of whether belief observables exist, see 
Ruetsche 1998 and Arntzenius 1998.  
Intuitively, we believe that the physical state of the universe is relevant to what mental 
states people have: we think that the reason a competent observer like Eve believes that a 
particle is x-spin up is that the particle really is x-spin up, or at least that the pointer on a good 
measuring apparatus points to ‘up’. On the single-mind and many-minds interpretations with 
the standard semantics, though, that is not the case: Eve believes that the particle is x-spin up 
and that the pointer points to ‘up’, but those beliefs are false.  
It is true that the quantum state is relevant to the evolution of mental states; the 
probabilities for the evolution of mental states supervene on the quantum state. But I maintain 
that this does not give sufficient evidence that the quantum state corresponds to something 
physically real. One can instead take the quantum state to be part of the dynamical equation 
for minds. The dynamical equation for minds would then establish the probabilities for the 
evolution of mental states. 
I will now consider an objection to that proposal. The objection begins by stating that, 
according to the proposal, the dynamical equation for minds would constitute the fundamental 
law of nature, but that law of nature would change with time, corresponding to the change of 
the quantum state with time. The objection maintains that laws of nature are meant to hold for 
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all time, not to change over time.  
My first reply is that this objection assumes that there are laws of nature, but this 
position has been cogently if controversially argued against by Bas van Fraassen (1989). My 
second reply is that, perhaps laws of nature do exist, but it turns out that laws of nature do 
after all change with time. If that is what our best physics tells us about laws of nature, then 
that is the philosophical view we should accept.  
For those who reject the first and second replies, then my third reply is that it need not 
be the law itself which changes over time. The law can simply incorporate a free parameter 
corresponding to the quantum state, and the value of that parameter can change with time.  
One may object to the proposal in the third reply by pointing out that it is meaningless 
to talk about this free parameter changing if nothing in the world corresponds to the change in 
parameter. In reply, one can postulate the existence of a property of the mental world as a 
whole, or of some part of the world, such that the value of that property corresponds to the 
value of the parameter in the dynamical equation for minds.  
I conclude that, on the dualistic interpretations, the physical world is otiose. Thus, 
there is not sufficient reason for proponents of these interpretations to postulate the existence 
of the physical world; the most reasonable ontology of these interpretations is not dualism, but 
mental monism. This conclusion does not entail that these interpretations are false, but it does 
show that proponents of these interpretations, who present their ideas in a dualistic 
framework, need to get more clear on what ontology they are promulgating, and why they are 
promulgating it.  
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